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Abstract
What can it mean for preferences to be rational when transitivity
or completenss are not assumed? In this paper we provide a frame-
work and a set of conditions to deal with this question. We provide
representation results in terms of a pair of functions, a utility function
and a vagueness function.
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11 Introduction
Standard preferences in economic modelling are complete and transitive.
However, such assumptions may not be adequate at the descriptive level,
especially when the alternatives are complex (for example when they carry
several attributes).1 Even at the normative level, arguments such as ‘money
pumps’ used to justify the need for transitivity meet many objections.2 More-
over, there has been some recent interest in incomplete preferences suggesting
how an individual may be ‘vague’, or ‘undecided’, i.e. unable to choose be-
tween alternatives, without necessarily being irrational (Mandler [7], Dubra,
Maccheroni and Ok [3], Masatlioglu and Ok [8]). The two issues of transitivity
and completeness are related: if preferences are incomplete (but transitive)
because of cognitive limitations, the way they are completed may in principle
generate cycles. For example, we may judge alternatives ﬁrst on the basis
of a certain criterion, say fairness, and when we encounter two alternatives
that cannot be ranked by fairness we turn to a supplementary criterion, say
eﬃciency. It is easy to see that even when the two criteria of justice and
eﬃciency are themselves transitive, the combination of the two need not be.3
In this paper we propose a framework in which the question of rationality
can be posed in a diﬀerent way. We show that even when the two standard
rationality properties of transitivity and completeness are dropped, it is still
possible to draw a sharp distinction between rationality and irrationality.
We view incompleteness, interpreted as cognitive vagueness, as the funda-
mental phenomenon, since we will show that acyclicity is implied by some
standard and more basic rationality requirement. The question we would
like to address is then: How vague can a rational individual be?
This question can be taken in two senses. First, it may mean: To what
extent can someone be vague? But it can also mean: In what way can some-
one be vague? It is the second question that interests us. We ﬁnd that
while there is no limit to the ‘amount’ of vagueness a rational individual may
experience (including the extreme case in which no two alternatives can be
compared), there is a rather speciﬁc structure that ‘rational vagueness’ must
obey.
1See for instance Tversky [12], [13] and Slovic [11].
2See e.g. Fishburn [5]and Mongin [9].
3Suppose that a is fairer than c but b cannot be ranked with either a or c in terms of
fairness. If c is more eﬃcient than b and b more eﬃcient than a, and fairness is applied
before eﬃciency, the resulting preferences are cyclic: c is preferred to b which is preferred
to a which is preferred to c.
2Let’s now be more speciﬁc as to the rationality conditions we consider.
Our main innovation is adding a new primitive to the standard formulation
of a decision problem (consisting of a set of alternatives and a preference
relation). This new primitive is a binary operation, which we call Keep Your
Options Open (KYOO) operation. When two alternatives a and b are com-
bined through the KYOO operation, the result is a ‘higher order’ alternative
with the meaning that the decision between a and b is left ‘open’. The possi-
bility to KYOO is common in economic and other everyday decisions. Except
in cases where there is an absolute deadline and you are exactly at the dead-
line, when valuing objects or states you can always not decide immediately,
‘sleep over it’, ‘take a deep breath’, and so on. Keeping the options open
between several alternatives creates a new decision situation. We propose
that, in order to assess the rationality of an individual’s preferences over
certain alternatives, we also consider his preferences over the extended set
of alternatives, which includes such decision situations. We are able to im-
pose sharp, powerful and easily understandable axioms on such preferences,
w h i c hl e a dt os p e c i ﬁc characterisation results for the preferences on the basic
alternatives. The ﬁrst condition is a ‘sure-thing’ property. If you prefer a
to b and c to d, then you will prefer to keep your options open between a
and c rather than between b and d. This seemingly uncontroversial property
guarantees acyclicity, and via a classical representation result by Bridges [1],
leads to our ﬁrst representation result (Theorem 3) which uses both a ‘util-
ity’ and a ‘vagueness’ function. We argue that this representation is suited
to express ‘psychological’ preferences - based on introspection -, as opposed
to ‘behavioural’ ones - based on choice. Our second result (Theorem 4) spe-
cialises the vagueness function somewhat, to obtain an interval order. This is
done by imposing a second axiom (‘noncomparability’) which states that an
individual is vague if and only if he prefers to postpone a choice rather than
making it. We argue that this characterises all ‘behavioural’ (i.e. choice-
revealed) preferences, as well as a certain class of psychological preferences.
The proof uses a classical theorem by Fishburn [4], as well as a mild auxiliary
condition.
There are two notable contributions (Danan [2] and Luce [6]) with which
our own shares the insight of adding a binary operation on the basic objects
of analysis. Luce’s measurement theory based on the idea of ‘joint receipts’
has in fact inspired our approach. The joint receipt operation has some
formal features similar to the KYOO operation of this paper, but is somewhat
diﬀerent in other respects. We highlight the diﬀerences and similarities as
3they arise in the text (Remarks 1 and 2).
Danan [2] introduced a ‘ﬂexibility’ operator which is very close, both for-
mally and conceptually, to the KYOO operator. In Danan’s approach, an
agent can decide to ‘learn then act’. This is similar to the idea of ‘keeping
one’s options’ open. At the formal level, his ‘learning-then-acting’ axiom and
our ‘noncomparability’ axiom are the same. However, the focus in Danan’s
paper is quite diﬀerent from ours. His concern is to establish a link between
behavioural and psychological preferences. This is done through several prop-
erties including learning-then-acting. Our interest, on the contrary, is on the
structure and representation of incomplete preferences that can be described
as ‘rational’.
2 Preliminaries
Ab i n a r yr e l a t i o nB on a set A of alternatives is said to satisfy:
• asymmetry,i fxBy implies not yBx;
• acyclicity,i fx1Bx2B...Bxn−1Bxn implies xn  = x1;
• transitivity, if xByBz implies xBz;
• intervality,i fxBy and vBw implies xBw or vBy.
The following two theorems due to Bridges [1] and Fishburn [4] establish
representation results4 which will be instrumental for our own representation
theorems:
Theorem 1 (Bridges [1]) Let B be a binary relation on a countable set X.
Then B satisﬁes acyclicity if and only if there exists a function u : X → R
such that, for all x,y ∈ X:
xBy ⇒ u(x) >u (y)
Theorem 2 (Fishburn [4]) Let B be a binary relation on a countable set X.
Then B satisﬁes intervality if and only if there exist functions u : X → R
and σ : X → R++ such that, for all x,y ∈ X:
xBy ⇐⇒ u(x) >u(y)+σ (y)
4Bridges [1] also oﬀers a simpler proof for the theorem by Fishburn reported here.
4Let A be a countable set of alternatives. Let ⊕ denote a binary operation
on A. We assume that the operation ⊕ can be extended recursively to pairs of
t h et y p e( a1 ⊕ ... ⊕ an,b 1 ⊕ ...⊕ bm) provided that ai  = bj for all i =1 ,...,n
and j =1 ,...,m.L e tA⊕ be the closure of A under ⊕. This operation is also
assumed to be:
• commutative: a ⊕ b = b ⊕ a
• associative: (a ⊕ b) ⊕ c = a ⊕ (b ⊕ c).
So, for example, if A = {a,b,c} then A⊕ can be written as A⊕ =
{a,b,c,a ⊕ b,a ⊕ c,b ⊕ c,a ⊕ b ⊕ c}.T h es e tA⊕ is clearly isomorphic to the
power set 2A, but as will be clear later, our contribution is deﬁnitely not in
the vein of the literature on extending a preference relation on a set to the
power set (to express preferences over ‘opportunity sets’).5
Although we are ultimately interested in characterising preferences over
‘pure’ outcomes in A, we consider also preferences over the set of ‘mixtures’
obtained by applying ⊕ recursively. That is, preferences are modelled as a
relation   on A⊕. The only assumption made throughout on   is that it is
irreﬂexive. We write a ∼ b to mean both a 
 b and b 
 a.
The interpretation of ⊕ is as a ‘Keep Your Options Open’ (KYOO) op-
eration: a⊕b means that both a and b are left available. The commutativity
property simply means that having the option to decide between a and b is
just the same thing as having the option to decide between b and a.T h e
associativity property is a bit more subtle. It means that having the option
to decide between: (i) a and (ii) having the option to decide between b and
c is the same thing as having the option to decide between (iii) having the
option to decide between a and b and (iv) c. This simply deﬁnes the notion
of a higher order option. If one thinks of a sequential choice interpretation
of objects such as a ⊕ (b ⊕ c), associativity amounts to an assumption of
‘consequentialism’ in the following sense: two ‘decision trees’ are the same
whenever for every path of the ﬁrst tree there is a path leading to the same
outcome in the second tree, and conversely. Alternatively, one may interpret
the KYOO operation simply as one of ‘lumping together’, with no sequential
structure.
5For example, while in that literature a ‘monotonicity’ axiom - stating that a set is
better than at least some of its subsets - is standard and sensible, in our context this is
not necessarily true: there is no reason to prefer a ⊕ b to either a or b (when for example
a   b).
5Remark 1 The associativity feature of the KYOO operation makes it sim-
ilar to Luce’s ‘joint receipt’ operation (see e.g. [6]), and dissimilar from a
lottery over basic alternatives.
In the sequel, we will introduce some properties of preferences over A⊕
that involve the application of the KYOO operation.
3 A fundamental property
The ﬁrst property that we introduce has to do with the ‘mixing’ of alterna-
tives for which the individual is able to establish a preference:
 − Sure Thing For all a,b,c,d ∈ A⊕, a   b,c   d ⇒ a ⊕ c   b ⊕ d
This is for us an uncontroversial postulate of rationality at least if a ⊕ c
and b⊕d are viewed as decision situations whose only value is their capacity
to lead to a ﬁnal resolution. No matter how the decision situation b ⊕ d is
eventually resolved, the decision situation a ⊕ c c a nb er e s o l v e di naw a y
that is strictly better. The only potential criticism we can think of, used
sometimes against axioms which are formally similar, has to do with positive
or negative ‘complementarities’. However, given our interpretation of the
KYOO operation this line of criticism does not apply, since the receipt of
one of the alternatives in a mixture is exclusive and not joint: spillovers
cannot arise.
Remark 2 This distinguishes our interpretation from Luce’s ‘joint receipt’
approach. In this respect two alternatives combined through the KYOO
operation are more similar to a gamble over those two alternatives.
For future reference, we also deﬁne a similar principle, which however
appears to have a less compelling appeal than  − Sure Thing.
∼− Sure Thing For all a,b,c,d ∈ A⊕, a ∼ b,c ∼ d ⇒ a ⊕ c ∼ b ⊕ d
As we show below, the  − Sure Thing axiom on its own is powerful
enough to restrict preferences dramatically:
6Theorem 3 If   satisﬁes  − Sure Thing then
(i) there exist functions u : A → R and σ : A × A → R+ with σ (a,b)=
σ (b,a), such that
a   b ⇔ u(a) >u(b)+σ(a,b)
(ii) In addition, if A is ﬁnite then the function σ can be chosen as follows:
σ (a,b)=σ (b,a)=0for all a,b with a   b
and
σ (a,b)=σ(b,a)=1for all a,b with a ∼ b
Proof. (i) First we show that  − Sure Thing implies acyclicity. Sup-
pose in negation that a1   a2   ...   an   a1 for some a1,...,a n ∈ A.T h e n
by successive applications of  − Sure Thing we have:
a1 ⊕ a2   a2 ⊕ a3
(a1 ⊕ a2) ⊕ a3   (a2 ⊕ a3) ⊕ a4
. . .
(...(a1 ⊕ a2) ⊕ ...an−1) ⊕ an   (...(a2 ⊕ a3) ⊕ ...⊕ an) ⊕ a1
The last relation is a contradiction in view of the irreﬂexivity6 of   and the
commutativity and associativity of ⊕.
By Theorem 1, this implies that there exists a function u : A → R such
that a   b ⇒ u(a) >u(b) for all a,b ∈ A.N o wf o ra l la,b ∈ A such that




and for all a,b ∈ A such that a ∼ b choose
σ (a,b)=σ (b,a)=|u(a) − u(b)|
So we have that
a   b ⇒ u(a)=u(b)+( u(a) − u(b)) >u(b)+σ (a,b)
proving one direction of the statement, and
u(a) >u(b)+σ (a,b) ⇒ σ (a,b) < |u(a) − u(b)|
6Note that although irreﬂe x i v i t yi si m p l i e db ya c y c l i c i t y ,w eh a v et oa s s u m ei ti n d e -
pendently in order to prove acyclicity.
7The last inequality and the deﬁnition of σ imply that it cannot be a ∼ b.
Since it cannot be b   a either (given that u(a) >u(b)), it must be a   b.




{u(a) − u(b)|a   b}




and for all a,b ∈ A such that a ∼ b choose
σ (a,b)=σ (b,a)=|u(a) − u(b)|
Proceeding as for the general case one can see that this specialisation repre-
sents preferences. Rescaling the functions u and σ ﬁnally yields the claim of
the statement7.
This result has an obvious interpretation. Provided the single rationality
principle of  − Sure Thing is satisﬁed, an individual’s preferences can be
modeled by means of a ‘utility’ function u and a ‘vagueness’ function σ.T h e
individual is able to make a comparison between two alternatives if and only
if his ‘vagueness’ is suﬃciently low compared to the utility diﬀerence of the
alternatives.
When the set of alternatives is ﬁnite, the representation is considerably
simpliﬁed, as the vagueness function can be taken to assume only two values.
A natural interpretation is that the individual can be in one of only two
psychological states: ‘confused’ or ‘not confused’.
Finally, a principle of ‘optimality’, at least as embodied by acyclicity, can
be recovered from the  − Sure Thing axiom8.T h i si sn o t e w o r t h yi nv i e wo f
the opinion, expressed by leading scholars9, that acyclicity of preferences is
not a normatively compelling property.
7Note that obviously if u and σ represent preferences, then so do v = λu + α and
τ = λσ.
8We call this a principle of optimality bacause, at least in the ﬁnite case, acyclicity
of the strict preference is suﬃcient to guarantee the existence of a maximal element, so
that the individual can be seen as ‘maximising’ the utility u, albeit imperfectly due to the
vagueness σ.
9E.g. Fishburn [5], Mongin [9].
84 ‘Psychological’ versus ‘behavioural’ prefer-
ences
We view Theorem 3 as representing rational ‘psychological preferences’, that
is those disclosed by the decision maker after accessing his own ‘internal
feelings’: the key aspect is that the decision maker only has to express an
opinion in his comparison of the alternatives. From this perspective it is
entirely plausible for an agent to declare that for instance he is undecided
(i.e. unable to compare) between two alternatives a and b,a n dy e tp r e f e ra n y
of them to postponing a decision, that is both a and b might be preferred to
their mixture a ⊕ b.
This type of reasoning is ruled out of necessity if we look at ‘choice-
revealed preferences’, that is if we require an agent to choose (rather than
express a preference) between a and b. In the case of the two alternatives
a and b he can either choose a,o rc h o o s eb, or postpone a choice between
these two alternatives by selecting their mixture a ⊕ b: there are no other
options. So if the mixture is selected, one must infer that the agent is
unable to compare a and b, in the sense of a and b being in the relation ∼.
Based on these considerations, in the case of behavioural (i.e. choice-revealed)
preferences the following axiom seems compelling (in addition to  − Sure
Thing):
Noncomparability For all a,b ∈ A⊕, a ∼ b ⇔ a ⊕ b   a and a ⊕ b   b.
So we regard the Noncomparability axiom just as a matter of logic in the
choice-revealed interpretation of preferences: being unable to compare a and
b means preferring not to choose between a and b.
The fact that this property is not simply a matter of logic in the alter-
native, psychological, interpretation does not imply that it does not have a
meaning in that context. In that case its correct interpretation is as a ‘bias’
towards keeping one’s options open. To understand this, consider ﬁrst the
implication
{a ⊕ b   a and a ⊕ b   b} ⇒ a ∼ b (1)
If there was a strict preference between a and b,s a y ,a   b, it would seem plain
contradictory to prefer to keep one’s options open between a and b.T h e r e -
fore we regard implication 1 of the axiom as an uncontroversial rationality
requirement, whether or not preferences are interpreted psychologically.
9The psychologically substantive part of the axiom is the converse impli-
cation
a ∼ b ⇒ {a ⊕ b   a and a ⊕ b   b} (2)
This means that if you cannot decide between a and b, then you prefer to
postpone a decision. Although this is reasonable, it is conceivable that one
would regard this postponement as worse than either a or b simply because
he dislikes a situation of indecision. Hence our interpretation as a bias in
favour of keeping one’s options open.
The following example illustrates the situation in which this bias may
not apply with a psychological interpretation of preferences. Suppose Mr.
Q is taking Miss She out on their ﬁrst date, which will comprise a movie
followed by dinner at a nearby restaurant. There are three movie theatres
showing the chosen ﬁlm, with a restaurant just round the corner. Cinema 1
is adjacent to a restaurant with both a (cheap) bar and a (more expensive)
restaurant menu in distinct dining rooms. Cinemas 2 and 3 are next to a
(cheap) bar and a (more expensive) restaurant, respectively. Mr. Q may
have conﬂicting fears of, on the one hand, appearing stingy and on the other
hand overdoing it in trying to impress his new date. So he may be undecided
on what type of dinner is better. Choosing cinema 1 would keep Mr. Q’s
options open. Still, he might regard the postponement of the decision as
spoiling his enjoyment of the movie. Thus, although he is psychologically
indiﬀerent between cinema 2 or 3, he prefers either one of them to keeping
the matter unresolved.
To summarise, the Noncomparability axiom may or may not be violated
by psychological preferences, but it is a compelling requirement in the case
of behavioural preferences.
As an additional straightforward rationality requirement we introduce the
following axiom:
Independence of Dominated Alternatives (IDA) For any distinct al-
ternatives a1,a 2,...,an ∈ A, a1 ⊕ ... ⊕ ai−1 ⊕ ai+1... ⊕ an ∼ a1 ⊕ a2 ⊕
... ⊕ ai−1 ⊕ ai ⊕ ai+1... ⊕ an if there exists some aj   ai.
This axiom simply states that enlarging the set of options further to a
dominated alternative does not make any diﬀerence to the evaluation of the
original composite alternative.
Adding Noncomparability and IDA to  − Sure Thing yields our second
a n dm a i nr e p r e s e n t a t i o nr e s u l t .I nt h i sc a s ew ea r ea b l et od e r i v ee v e nm o r e
10structure by specifying the ‘vagueness’ function σ so that it only depends on
one alternative:
Theorem 4 If   satisﬁes IDA,  − Sure Thing and Noncomparability then
there exist functions u : A → R and σ : A → R+ such that a   b if and only
if u(a) >u(b)+σ (b)
Proof. Step 1. For all a,b,c,d ∈ A⊕, a ∼ b, c ∼ d ⇒ a ⊕ c ∼ b ⊕ d
(∼− Sure Thing). Suppose a ∼ b, c ∼ d. By Noncomparability this implies
a ⊕ b   a
a ⊕ b   b
c ⊕ d   c
c ⊕ d   d
Then by  − Sure Thing
a ⊕ b ⊕ c ⊕ d   a ⊕ c
a ⊕ b ⊕ c ⊕ d   b ⊕ d
At this point a second application of Noncomparability yields a ⊕ c ∼ b ⊕ d,
as desired.
Step 2. Intervality. Suppose a   b and c   d.T h e na   d or c   b.
Violations can occur in four cases:
1. b   c and d   a: this generates the cycle a   b   c   d   a,w h i c hb y
the proof of Theorem 3 contradicts  − Sure Thing.
2. a ∼ d and b   c: a ∼ d and Noncomparability imply
a ⊕ d   a
Moreover by  − Sure Thing applied to b   c and c   d we have
b ⊕ c   c ⊕ d
Applying once more  − Sure Thing to the displayed preferences yields
a ⊕ b ⊕ c ⊕ d   a ⊕ c ⊕ d, which contradicts IDA.
3. a   d and b ∼ c: as case 2 above.
114. a ∼ d and b ∼ c:  − Sure Thing on a   b and c   d implies
a ⊕ c   b ⊕ d
whereas step 1 implies the contradiction
a ⊕ c ∼ b ⊕ d
Step 3: There exist functions as in the statement. This step follows from
step 2 and Theorem 2.
Remark 3 Although transitivity of strict preference was not assumed, the
result above shows that it is a consequence of the axioms, since u(x) >
u(y)+σ(y)a n du(y) >u(z)+σ (z)i m p l yt h a tu(x) >u(z)+σ (z).
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have considered what it may mean for an individual’s pref-
erences to be rational even when they are not assumed to be complete or
transitive. To this aim, we have enlarged the space of basic alternatives to
allow preferences for ‘keeping one’s options open’. We have found, ﬁrst, that
a standard sure-thing rationality property implies acyclicity. We have then
shown that the rational incompleteness of preferences must possess a speciﬁc
structure, and may be captured by a pair of functions: a standard utility
function and a ‘vagueness’ function.
In our ﬁrst representation theorem the vagueness term depends on both
alternatives. This representation ﬁts ‘psychological’ preferences. In our sec-
ond representation result, which adds some conditions, vagueness depends
on one alternative only. At the formal level, rational incompleteness is here
representable as an interval order. This representation ﬁts behavioural pref-
erences, as well a particular variety of psychological preferences: those which
a r eb i a s e di nf a v o u ro fk e e p i n go n e ’ so p t i o n so p e n .
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